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ABSTRACT 
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performance under different levels of information-related capital market imperfections. We 
show empirically, on a sample of listed as well as unlisted firms, that for companies suffering 
from financing constraints, increasing competition leads to a decrease in both productivity 
and profitability while the opposite holds for non (less) constrained firms. This result is 
robust to alternative measures of competition and can be explained by differences in access to 
external financing and its impact on investment behavior. Combining the logic of option 
theory with the literature on competition, we argue that the value of postponing investment is 
influenced by both the intensity and the type of competitive interaction. Intense and 
aggressive competition pressures firms to exercise investment options early. For firms with 
limited access to external financing this pressure to invest exacerbates financing constraints, 
forcing them to leave valuable investment options unexercised. Overall, our results suggest 
that competition is not necessarily beneficial for firm performance and that the positive 
relation that is usually found in the recent governance literature, can be due to restricting the 
sample to listed firms, i.e., companies that suffer least from capital market imperfections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is generally accepted that product market competition affects firm performance. Although 
Nickell (1996) indicates that most people believe that competition is a good thing, theory and 
empirical evidence are not conclusive about its effects. This also holds for the relationship 
between firm performance and competition. While at a first cut the traditional Structure-
Conduct-Performance paradigm predicts a negative relationship (competition reduces 
monopoly rents), the empirical evidence is not clear on this score (see Robinson and 
McDougall, 1998, for a discussion). In fact, although a number of studies show that 
performance and competition are negatively related (e.g., Hill and Hansen, 1991; Ghosal, 
2002; Slade, 2004; Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson, 2005), a growing body of research linking 
corporate governance to competition, finds that competition actually improves firm 
performance (e.g., Nickell, 1996; Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden, 1997; Januszewski, Köke 
and Winter, 2002; Hou and Robinson, 2006). The latter studies, which typically focus on 
samples of listed firms only, explain the positive relationship shown by the data by arguing 
that competition improves the firms’ strategic and/or investment decisions through better 
managerial incentives and monitoring quality (e.g., Bozec, 2005; Karuna, 2007). However, 
this logic implicitly presumes that firms have easy access to the financial resources required 
for improvement, which need not be the case. It has been well recognized in the theoretical 
literature that in the presence of financing constraints, firms rather suffer from competition 
than benefit from it (e.g., Povel and Raith, 2004 or Maurer, 1999, for an overview). However, 
there is no direct empirical evidence on this issue.1 This paper aims at contributing on this 
latter score. To that end our sample not only includes listed firms but also unlisted ones of 
comparable size. After all, Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) and Giannetti (2003), among 
                                                
1
 Most empirical research in this area has revolved around analyzing the association between debt and product 
market strategies (e.g., Chevalier 1995a, 1995b; Phillips, 1995; Kovenock and Phillips, 1997; Zingales, 1998; 
and Campello, 2003, 2006). 
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others, point out that in many countries in the world, and in Europe in particular, most of 
even the larger firms remain unlisted.2 As a result, these latter companies are faced with 
information asymmetries causing them to be more financially constrained compared to listed 
firms (e.g., Kim, 1999; Maherault, 2000; Holod and Peek, 2007). 
This paper adds to the literature in three ways. To our knowledge, this research is the first 
to offer empirical evidence on how competition affects firm performance differently 
depending on access to external financing. This adds to our understanding of how financing 
constraints affect a company’s competitive position. Second, our findings provide additional 
insight into some of the conflicting findings in the literature. They show that results from 
samples consisting predominantly of listed firms (as is typically the case in the governance 
literature concerning competition) may be at odds with those generated by samples that 
mainly include unlisted companies. Third, our paper is the first to document how different 
aspects of competition (in our case, market concentration and strategic interactions) affect 
firm performance under different degrees of capital market imperfections and how these 
aspects interact with each other.3 
The logic of real options theory offers a direct way to link financing constraints with 
competitive pressure and performance. Specifically, McDonald and Siegel (1986) and 
Pindyck (1988), among others, show that in case there is no competition, uncertainty causes 
firms to postpone investment because of the time value embedded in the investment option. 
However, in contexts where competitors can pre-empt, firms are pressured to exercise their 
investment options without delay (e.g., Dixit, 1989; Williams, 1993; Grenadier, 1996, among 
                                                
2
 Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) construct a database of all large firms (operating revenues above $ 50 million) 
of 19 European countries. They report that about 87% of these companies are private and only 13% are listed. 
As a European stock market typically requires a minimum size of about 1.5 million euros in equity book value, 
all the firms in the study amply satisfy the minimal size requirement for listing. 
3
 Karuna (2007) provides some indirect evidence of the importance of distinguishing different aspects of 
competition in explaining its relation with agency costs. He concludes that market concentration can not be 
considered the only measure of product market competition. 
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others). In fact, Akdogu and Mackay (2006) show empirically that as competitive intensity 
increases, companies indeed invest more quickly. As a result, firms with limited access to 
sources of financing can be forced to leave valuable investment opportunities unexercised. 
By combining this logic of real option theory with the governance perspective, we are able to 
derive testable hypotheses about the impact of competition on firm performance depending 
on the capital market imperfections firms are faced with. 
We study two measures of competition that capture different aspects of the competitive 
environment. The first measure represents the intensity of competition in the form of market 
concentration. While many empirical studies show that this measure of competitive intensity 
affects firm performance directly (e.g., Nickell et al., 1997; Hou and Robinson, 2005, among 
others), Ghosal and Loungani (1996, 2000) and Akdogu and Mackay (2006) also report an 
impact on investment behavior. Furthermore, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, 
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) show that apart from market concentration, investment 
behavior is also affected by the optimal reaction of firms towards expansion of their 
competitors’ market shares. Therefore, we introduce competitive interactions as a second 
aspect of competition. To that end, we use an empirical version of the competitive strategy 
measure (CSM), based on the work of Sundaram, John and John (1996). CSM allows to 
distinguishe between industries operating under more aggressive competition, i.e., 
competition in strategic complements, and industries operating under more accommodating 
competitive strategies, i.e., strategic substitutes. Of particular interest here is the fact that 
when competition is in strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes, profitability 
improves when a firm increases its investment level in reaction to competitors raising their 
investment. In turn, real option theory then predicts extra pressure to exercise the investment 
option early in order to capture those increased profits (i.e., similar to early exercising of a 
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call on a dividend-paying stock). Again, firms with limited access to extra financing can be 
forced to leave this valuable option unexercised. 
In constructing a sample of comparable firms that encompasses a wide range of 
differences in access to external finance, we include – except for some obvious pruning – all 
large Belgian companies that file consolidated financial statements, i.e., both listed and 
unlisted firms. Although it reduces sample size, using only Belgian firms with consolidated 
accounts offers several advantages. First, looking only at one country data provides a clean 
testing ground for our hypotheses because it avoids the problem of having to control for 
possibly many institutional differences that can confound results. Furthermore, Belgium is a 
typical continental European country where the bulk of large consolidated companies remains 
unlisted and where listed firms are predominantly controlled by large shareholders.4 As there 
is little variation in this mode of control, problems with possibly confounding governance 
factors are reduced. Next, our data selection assures that over our sample period, the 
consolidated accounts of listed and large unlisted firms are subject to the same accounting 
and certification rules. Additionally, as filing consolidated accounts is only necessary for 
large firms, and the size requirements for consolidation are well above the minimal listing 
requirements on a European stock exchange, size is no barrier to listing for any of our sample 
firms.5 Finally, as discussed later on, consolidated accounts also help us to overcome 
distortions due to the presence of some pyramidal ownership, in particular, the fact that 
subsidiaries of groups have access to internal capital markets. 
                                                
4
 It is generally accepted that, despite of the predominance of large block holders in the ownership structures of 
Western European companies, small shareholder protection is adequate to keep the expropriation risk at 
moderate levels (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999). 
5
 The comparability of our listed and unlisted firms is also evidenced by the fact that according to the peer 
groups constructed by the Amadeus data base, there is no systematic difference between the two classes of 
firms. In particular, the Amadeus data base constructs a peer group for each firm on the basis of trade 
descriptions. Within our sample, when in the same industry, listed and unlisted firms generally belong to the 
same peer group. 
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Our sample covers the period 1992-2005, and similarly to Giannetti (2003) and Holod 
and Peek (2007), we use stock listing to differentiate in the degree of information-related 
capital market imperfections. We find that listed and unlisted firms differ significantly in the 
way product market competition influences their performance. Competitive intensity, as 
measured inversely by market concentration, has a negative impact on both total factor 
productivity and return on assets in unlisted companies. By contrast, but in line with the 
predominant findings of the literature on governance, listed companies benefit from 
competitive intensity. Introducing the competitive strategy measure (CSM) reinforces these 
findings. Specifically, under more aggressive competitive interaction (i.e., competition in 
strategic complements) the performance of unlisted companies declines while it increases for 
listed firms compared to the situation where competition is in strategic substitutes. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that the impact of market concentration and strategic 
interaction on firm performance reinforce each other. Preceding findings and interpretations 
are corroborated by robustness tests including alternative measures of competition and by 
testing actual financing constraints on the basis of investment-cash flow sensitivity. In fact, 
the pattern of cash flow sensitivity among unlisted firms indicates the existence of financing 
constraints that are exacerbated when competitive pressure increases. For listed firms on the 
other hand, the pattern of cash flow sensitivity points towards free cash flow problems that 
are reduced by competition. Overall, our results show that both measures of competition, 
market concentration as well as strategic interactions, drive the disciplining effects for listed 
firms, on the one hand, and exacerbate the harmful financing constraints for unlisted 
companies, on the other. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give an 
overview of the literature on the relationship between competition and firm performance, and 
present our hypotheses concerning the impact of capital market imperfections on this 
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relationship. After that, we describe the sample selection, the measurement of variables and 
methodology. The next two sections present and discuss the results and report on the 
robustness checks. The final section concludes. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Below, we first summarize the literature concerning the impact of product market 
competition on firm performance. Next, we evaluate how information-related capital market 
imperfections affect listed and unlisted firms differently and how the access to external 
finance can explain this difference. Finally, we hypothesize how the latter influences the 
competition-performance relationship. 
 
Product market competition 
An important measure of product market competition that is commonly used is product 
market concentration. It can be interpreted as an inverse measure of competitive intensity in 
an industry. As mentioned in the introduction, the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance 
paradigm predicts a positive relationship between market concentration and performance 
because limited competition offers the opportunity to extract monopoly rents. However, 
subsequent empirical research indicates that confounding effects introduce ambiguity (see 
e.g., Caves, 2007, for an extensive overview). Furthermore, due to growing interest in 
corporate governance, the link between agency issues and competition has attracted an 
increasing amount of attention. Ample evidence shows that agency conflicts strongly impact 
on managerial decision making (see e.g., Januszewski et al., 2002 and Rogers, 2004, for an 
overview). In this setting, corporate governance studies typically theorize that intense product 
market competition ensures that efficient production remains a prime managerial aim (e.g., 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Hart, 1983). Furthermore, competition also improves 
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performance because it reduces free cash flow problems (e.g., Nickell, 1996; Nickel et al., 
1997; Jagannathan and Srinivasan, 1999; Karuna, 2007). On the one hand, through the 
presence of more competitors, a reduction in market concentration offers more opportunities 
for comparison, improving monitoring quality and reducing agency problems between 
shareholders and managers. On the other hand, low market concentration is likely to offer 
less insulation from industry shocks. This in turn increases the probability of bankruptcy, 
providing incentives for managers to try and avoid this outcome through hard work and less 
free cash flow waste. 
Preceding arguments implicitly presume that companies always have the financial 
resources available to make the adjustments forced onto them by competitive pressure. This 
need not be the case. In fact, Povel and Raith (2004) show that in an environment where 
financing constraints are important, competition will amplify these constraints and limit the 
reaction capacity of companies to competitive threats. Moreover, Boyle and Guthrie (2003), 
Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2007), have shown, 
theoretically as well as empirically, that constrained firms tend to solve financing issues by 
postponing investment. Only under limited competitive pressure is this an option, however, 
as shown by Akdogu and MacKay (2006). Their study concludes that, in line with the logic 
of real options, firms in monopolistic industries that run a limited risk of pre-emption have a 
tendency to delay investment. However, as explained in the introduction, when the risk of 
pre-emption becomes important, firms do no longer have this opportunity. If binding 
financing constraints make immediate investment impossible, this will result in under-
investment and performance decline. 
Next to market concentration, strategic interactions also affect the pressure to invest 
quickly. For incumbents can either react aggressively by increasing investment (i.e., in the 
case of competition in strategic complements) or invest sparingly and follow a more 
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accommodating strategy (i.e., in the case of competition in strategic substitutes). Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1984) and Bulow et al. (1985) have demonstrated that the optimal competitive 
strategy depends upon the slope of a firm’s optimal reaction curve to industry shocks. 
Specifically, when in a particular industry, a firm’s marginal profits increase in competitor 
output around the industry equilibrium (i.e., the slope of the reaction curve is positive), the 
optimal response is to match competitor’s investment behavior and thus compete 
aggressively. Conversely, if marginal profits decrease (i.e., the slope of the reaction curve is 
negative), the optimal response of a firm to an increase in output by a rival is to stay put or 
even decrease its own output. Contrary to the case of competition under strategic substitutes, 
under competition in strategic complements, the logic of real options theory predicts early 
exercise of an investment option ceteris paribus. For similar to the case of an early exercise of 
a call option on a dividend paying stock, the fact that firms forgo profits by not investing 
immediately causes them to invest more quickly.6 Of course, the second situation again 
presupposes that financing sources are available in order to adapt investment behavior when 
necessary. 
There are many empirical studies on product market competition that use market 
concentration as a measure of product market competition (see Hou and Robinson, 2006, for 
an extensive literature review). The alternative measure, based on competitive interactions, 
has mostly been studied in theoretical models. Sundaram et al. (1996) were the first to 
construct an empirical competitive strategy measure (CSM) to distinguish between aggressive 
and more accommodating forms of competitive behavior. They document that this measure 
explains differences in observed stock market reactions to announcements of R&D outlays. 
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 This could be regarded as the outcome of a sub game perfect equilibrium, whereby, in reaction to competitors 
raising their investment, a firm immediately exercises its real option to invest. See for example Grenadier, 1996, 
where, depending upon external circumstances, the model predicts either a sub game perfect equilibrium in 
which a firm prefers to invest immediately when competitors invest or an equilibrium where a firm prefers to 
postpone investment at the time the leader decides to invest. 
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Since then, several papers have used the CSM measure to study the impact of strategic 
interaction on the announcement effect of new product launches and capital expenditures 
(Chen, Ik and Lee, 2002 and Chen, Lin and Shih, 2004), the structuring of CEO 
compensation schemes (Kedia, 2006), the exit by start-up firms (Huyghebaert and Van De 
Gucht, 2004) and capital structure decisions (Lyandres, 2006). 
The preceding discussion implies that competitive interaction affects corporate 
performance. First, just like market concentration, it is apt to influence the agency costs of 
free cash flow; competition in strategic complements can be expected to have a strong 
disciplining effect on discretionary spending because of its pressure on profitability and the 
need to align investment timing with the investment moves of rivals. Next, the matching 
behavior in industries where firms tend to compete under strategic complements offers 
improved opportunities for comparison. In addition, this more aggressive type of competition 
is also likely to increase the probability of bankruptcy, thereby providing extra incentives for 
managers to work harder. By contrast, just as in the case of market concentration, the 
pressure to match the behavior of rivals entails the need to speed up investment and, hence, 
may exacerbate financing constraints. 
 
Information-related capital market imperfections  
The finance literature provides ample evidence that a strong development of financial 
systems brings about economic and industry growth (e.g., Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). From the perspective of an 
individual firm, many studies discuss the benefits and costs of going/being public (e.g., Allen, 
1993; Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, 1998; Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004). The latter 
stream of research shows that the most important advantages of listing are 
transparency/information production in financial markets and subsequent increased access to 
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financial resources. This will strongly reduce the information-related capital market 
imperfections a listed firm is faced with (e.g., Giannetti, 2003 and Holod and Peek, 2007). As 
for most important disadvantages, research by Jensen (1989), Mayer and Alexander (1991) 
and Myers (2000), among others, indicates that these are in all likelihood the agency 
problems between insiders (i.e., management and controlling owners) and outside 
shareholders. 
 
Hypotheses 
Preceding logic suggests differences in the way competitive pressure influences the 
performance of listed and unlisted firms. Unlisted companies operate in a less transparent 
environment and are thus confronted with more information-related capital market 
imperfections which increase the likelihood of financing constraints. These constraints 
become harmful when – due to competitive pressure – investment cannot be postponed. 
Simultaneously, in view of their concentrated ownership and the absence of small public 
shareholders, unlisted firms are unlikely to benefit from those aspects of competition that 
involve a reduction of the agency costs of free cash flow and its ensuing increase in 
efficiency. Therefore, we hypothesize that for unlisted companies, competitive pressure may 
even result in productivity losses and decreasing profitability. We expect this effect to be 
most pronounced in industries that are characterized by competition in strategic complements 
where companies are under extra pressure to invest rapidly. 
For listed firms, the situation is very different in the following three aspects. First of all, 
notwithstanding the transparency/information production in public markets, the presence of 
small outside shareholders creates conflicts of interest with insiders.7 Following Jagannathan 
                                                
7
 As in Continental Europe ownership concentration remains substantial in public firms, free cash flow 
problems likely are smaller as compared to the situation with dispersed ownership. Nevertheless, as compared to 
unlisted ones, the separation between ownership and control is more important, and conflicts of interest may 
arise. 
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and Srinivasan (1999) and Rogers (2004) we argue that the presence of more rivals mitigates 
such problems because the increased competitive pressure provides more opportunities for 
comparison. Furthermore, this mechanism is likely to function very effectively when 
competition is in strategic complements because the matching behavior improves 
comparability further. Finally, unlike unlisted firms, listed companies have better access to 
outside financing and therefore have more opportunities to develop an effective response to 
the strategies of rivals. We expect this financial flexibility to be especially helpful in less 
concentrated industries competing in strategic complements where the benefits of immediate 
investment likely outweigh the real option value of waiting (e.g., Akdogu and MacKay, 
2006). Preceding logic implies the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher competitive pressure, as measured by lower market concentration, 
improves the performance of firms that do not suffer from severe information-related 
capital market imperfections (i.e., listed companies). For firms that are confronted with 
severe information-related capital market imperfections (i.e., unlisted firms), this impact 
is less beneficial or even detrimental. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher competitive pressure under the form of aggressive strategic 
interactions (i.e., competition in strategic complements) improves the performance of 
firms that do not suffer from severe information-related capital market imperfections (i.e., 
listed companies). For firms that are confronted with severe information-related capital 
market imperfections (i.e., unlisted firms), this impact is less beneficial or even 
detrimental. 
 
SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
Our sample covers the 14 years 1992–2005 and initially consists of all consolidated financial 
statements of Belgian firms. These data were gathered from the NBB, the National Bank of 
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Belgium, and Van Dijk Belfirst.8 Issuing consolidated statements only became a requirement 
in 1992, and then only for firms of sufficient size.9 Moreover, the thresholds are significantly 
above the minimal size requirements for listing on European stock exchanges, so that lack of 
size does not hamper our unlisted sample firms to go public.10 Because of the presence of 
pyramidal structures, the status of being unlisted requires special attention. Specifically, we 
exclude unlisted companies that either have a listed parent or a listed subsidiary. We also 
exclude all companies that are mere production entities of a large international parent. In 
order to identify these latter companies we used data from either Amadeus or from the firms’ 
websites.11 Finally, we exclude all financial firms. As we wish to avoid selection biases, it is 
important that companies can enter or leave during the sample period. Therefore, we also 
include firms that change their public/private status. To minimize the influence of outliers in 
our analysis, we replace extreme observations of all ratio variables with missing values.12 
Extreme observations include values in the 99th percentile and, for variables with negative 
values, also those in the 1st percentile. 
                                                
8
 The Amadeus and Belfirst databases are constructed by the same data provider, Bureau Van Dijk. Belfirst is 
country-specific (i.e., it encompasses only Belgian data) and contains more detailed financial statement 
information than Amadeus. 
9
 Contrary to the US, larger companies in Europe often split off their production entities into subsidiaries with 
separate legal identity (e.g., see Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2006 and Bianco and Nicodano, 2006, among 
others). Hence, to obtain a clear picture of these larger companies one needs to use consolidated accounts. 
10
 Filing consolidated accounts becomes obligatory when 2 out of the following 3 size thresholds are exceeded: 
turnover exceeds 50 million euros, total assets exceeds 25 million euros, the company employs more than 500 
workers. From the year 2000 on, these criteria where relaxed to 25 million; 12.5 million and 250 respectively. 
Although the listed companies in our sample are on average older than their unlisted peers, the average age of 
both our listed and unlisted sample firms, i.e., respectively 51 and 34 years, indicates well established (mature) 
firms. 
11
 Subsidiaries from parents that have to issue consolidated accounts do not need to issue these consolidated 
statements themselves. Therefore, our sample generally treats business groups as stand-alone entities. In this 
way, problems and/or noise caused by including both stand-alones and subsidiaries can be avoided (e.g., within 
business groups subsidiaries have access to internal capital markets, which may impact on financing constraints 
issues). However, there are a few exceptions. Listed firms always have to publish such accounts and some 
unlisted companies may consolidate voluntarily. In our sample 66 unlisted firms consolidate voluntarily and 7 
listed companies do not satisfy the size requirement for consolidation but are obliged to consolidate because of 
their listed status. We performed robustness checks by deleting either of these types of firms. Results were not 
affected. 
12
 Using winsorizing instead does not affect our findings. 
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***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
Table 1, Panel A represents the sample composition over the different years. Overall, our 
sample consists of 2518 consolidated firm year observations for which 1812 correspond to 
unlisted and 706 to listed companies.13 Due to the extensive use of lagged variables in our 
estimation methodology, the first three years of data are lost in the final estimation of 
investment models as they are used as instruments for the corresponding variables in later 
years. Panel B of Table 1 gives an overview of the industry distribution. Manufacturing 
includes the largest number of firms (137), followed by services (124) and distribution (82). 
This distribution by industry is quite representative of the Belgian economy as a whole. 
 
Performance measures 
Following a growing literature (e.g., Nickell et al., 1997; Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999; 
Januszewski et al., 2002; Schoar, 2002; Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schone, 2005), we use a 
firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of performance. Firm-level TFP is 
obtained by estimating a log-linear Cobb–Douglas production function for each broad 
industry classification (as presented in Table 1, Panel B). Since coefficients on capital and 
labor can vary by industry, this specification allows for different factor intensities in different 
industries. The production function estimates per industry are pooled across listed and 
unlisted companies. The TFP measure for each individual company is the estimated residual 
of regression models of the following form: 
 
ijtijtjijtj0ijt eLNEMPL*LNNETAS*LNVA +β+α+α=   (1) 
                                                
13
 In order to avoid selection biases we include in our basic analysis also those firms that went public (or 
private) during the sample period. Excluding them from the sample, however, does not significantly alter our 
results. 
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with LNVAijt representing the output of firm i in industry j measured as the natural logarithm 
of value added,14 LNEMPLijt labor input measured as employment costs,15 LNNETASijt 
capital employed,16 measured as the accounting value of net assets during year t, and eijt an 
i.i.d. error term which represents the firm-specific TFP in a certain year. Like Schoar (2002), 
we will use these TFP measures as the dependent variable in our performance models.17 
As an alternative measure of performance, we use return on assets (ROA). Similarly to 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998), we define return on assets 
as net income (EBIT) divided by the book value of total assets. Although both TFP and ROA 
are measures of firm performance, they tend to capture a somewhat different aspect. While 
TFP can be interpreted as the productivity of a company relative to its broad industry 
classification, ROA captures primarily the profitability of a firm’s activities. See Palia and 
Lichtenberg (1999), Schoar (2002) and Barth et al. (2005), for a discussion on the relation 
between productivity and profitability. Note that we are unable to include Tobin’s Q because 
this measure is not available for unlisted firms.18 
 
Measures of product market competition 
Following Hou and Robinson (2006), market concentration was measured by the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of squared market shares over all companies in an 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
14
 Value added is defined as total sales less material costs. This way, we implicitly allow for material costs as a 
third input. 
15
 Given limited data availability, we proxy the number of employees by the total employment costs of the 
company. This is unlikely to cause problems because of the very high correlation between total cost of 
employees and number of employees. 
16
 As in the literature on capital budgeting, net working capital is treated as part of invested assets. 
17
 Unlike the literature on production functions, where the efficiency measure of Cobb-Douglas and its 
corresponding input factors are the issue of interest, we do not use correction methods for input factors such as 
for example the Olley-Pakes correction. As we use TFP solely as a relative performance measure; no corrections 
other than the fixed effect estimation, industry adjusting and lagging of input factors are made. Our approach to 
measuring TFP is similar to other studies in the ownership performance literature (Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999; 
Nickell et al., 1997; Januszewski et al., 2002; Schoar, 2002; Barth et al., 2005, among others). 
18
 If we use Tobin’s Q for the subsample of listed firms, however, and redo the analysis below, results for listed 
firms remain unaffected. 
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industry. We define industries on the basis of triple digit European-wide NACE codes. For 
each (triple digit Nace code) industry, we regard all consolidated European companies in the 
Amadeus data base as likely competitors of the Belgian consolidated companies in our 
sample.19 Market shares were calculated based on the proportion of a company’s turnover in 
the total turnover for that particular industry. Because of unavailability of sufficient industry 
data before 1995, we calculate the HHI measure on a yearly basis as of 1995.20 We also 
construct a dummy DHHI that takes the value 1 if the average market concentration of a 
particular industry in a particular year is above the sample median; otherwise it takes the 
value 0. 
Next, we calculate Sundaram et al.’s (1996) empirical competitive strategy measure 
(CSM). However, instead of defining it at firm-level with time series data for each firm, we 
calculate it across all firms of an industry to obtain an industry-wide perspective. This cross-
sectional approach is similar to the methodologies of Kedia (2006), Lyandres (2006) and 
Huyghebaert and Van De Gucht (2004). The former authors show that this approach reduces 
the noise involved in estimating each firm’s CSM. As argued by Lyandres (2006), moreover, 
the empirical CSM construction presumes symmetrical behavior of competing firms, which 
supports the notion of industry-wide behavior. Specifically, we consider each (triple digit 
NACE) industry in our sample and identify the competitor firms as all European firms filing 
consolidated statements in this industry. Then, we calculate the coefficient of correlation 
between each firm’s marginal profits (i.e., the change in profits divided by change in turnover 
for a certain year) and the change in competitor output, over all firms in a given industry as a 
proxy for the slope of the average reaction function. This yields an industry-specific CSM 
                                                
19
 Once they operate in the same industry, as mentioned earlier, the fact that the listed and unlisted firms in our 
sample generally belong to the same peer group (as defined in Amadeus), suggests that listed and unlisted 
companies also operate in similar markets. 
20
 Note that the years before 1995 only serve to calculate lags of our variables, as required by the GMM-
methodology. 
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value for each of our 149 triple digit NACE industries for any given year21. This value is 
positive when competition is in strategic complements and negative when competition is in 
strategic substitutes. Finally, we define a dummy, DCSM, which takes on the value 1 if the 
average industry CSM is positive in a particular year (i.e., aggressive interaction or strategic 
complements), and 0 otherwise (i.e., appeasing interaction or strategic substitutes). Following 
Kedia (2006), we apply a dummy specification to distinguish between the type of strategic 
interactions. Kedia (2006) argues that in order to properly estimate the slope of the reaction 
function, firm-specific price and output data should be used. As this data is unavailable, we 
are constrained to using sales data to proxy for the firm’s decision variables. Kedia (2006) 
shows that, when calculated in this way, the competitive strategy measure has the same sign 
as the slope of the real reaction function, although it differs in magnitude.22,23 
                                                
21
 Our CSM measure for a particular industry in a certain year can be formally defined as the correlation 
coefficient of ∆Πi/∆Si with ∆[(ΣSj)-Si]: 
 with  ∆Πi = the change in profits of firm i 
   ∆Si = the change in turnover of firm i 
∆[(ΣSj)-Si] = the change in sum of turnover of all firm i’s competitors; proxied by the 
sum of turnover of all firms in a particular industry minus Si. 
22
 A remaining potential problem with estimating the sign of the slope of an industry’s reaction function 
(DCSM) is that misclassification between DCSM 0 and 1 could occur due to an industry-wide demand shock. If 
all firms of a particular industry face increasing sales and profits over the sample period, reaction functions may 
shift upward. This could lead to an erroneous classification of an industry as competing in strategic 
complements while in fact the industry is characterized by strategic substitutes. Conversely, an industry-wide 
downward shift due to a downward shock in demand and profits could result in an erroneous classification as 
competition in strategic substitutes. The impact of this problem on our findings should be minimal, however for 
two reasons. First, in line with Kedia (2006), as we use a cross-sectional industry measure of competitive 
interaction instead of a firm-specific measure, which lowers the chance of misspecification due to demand 
shocks. Second, if industry-wide shocks were an important driver of our DCSM-variable, we would observe that 
industries classified as competing in strategic complements show high industry growth and profits, while the 
reverse would hold true for industries classified as competing in strategic substitutes. When we calculate the 
mean and median (European) industry sales growth, we find that there is no significant difference between 
industries with DCSM= 1 and DCSM = 0. Profit margins in industries classified as DCSM = 1 are always lower 
than those with DCSM = 0 and even significantly so in most years of the sample period. 
23
 Akdogu and MacKay (2006) suggest two strategy-based explanations for the influence of strategic 
interactions on the value of waiting. First, strategic real-options theory stresses a reactive explanation where the 
threat of losing opportunities to rivals prompts own firm investment. Second, industrial organization theory 
stresses a proactive explanation where own-firm investment is used to affect rivals’ investment. Although it may 
not be possible to disentangle them empirically, both explanations point to the importance of strategic 
interactions. In our own empirical setup however, even the firms in the high market concentration subsample 
cannot be considered to be dominant players in their corresponding, Europe-wide industries. This favors the 
reactive explanation over the proactive explanation. 
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Performance models 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use the following regression model: 
Performanceit  = αi + β1*SIZEit + β2*FINLEVit + β3*GROWTHjt +  
   δ1*COMPETITIONit + δ2*Lit + δ3*Interactions                              (2) 
 
As discussed earlier, we employ two alternative performance measures. We use TFP as a 
productivity measure and return on assets (ROA) as a measure of a firm’s profitability. The 
parameter αi represents an unobservable firm-level fixed effect. Following the literature, we 
define control variables to take firm characteristics into account and then add the variables of 
particular interest to our study. Many studies on firm performance have used size, leverage 
and growth opportunities as control variables. Specifically, firm size serves to control for 
possible economies of scale. Financial leverage is used to control for the influence of capital 
structure on investment behavior and managerial discretion. Finally, sales growth is included 
to capture the impact of demand conditions and business-cycle fluctuations on performance. 
We measure size (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of total assets; leverage (FINLEV) is 
measured as interest bearing debt relative to total assets and Growth opportunities 
(GROWTH) are measured by the relative change in sales (see e.g., Schoar, 2002; Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998, among others). 
Next, we augment Equation (2) with measures of competition. We use either market 
concentration (HHI) or the competitive strategy measure (DCSM). We define a listing 
dummy as Lit = 1, if firm i was listed in year t; Lit = 0 otherwise. Finally, we also use 
interaction terms between competition and the listing dummy to test for differences between 
the listed and unlisted subgroups. The appendix provides an overview of the variables’ 
definitions. 
 19 
As Arellano and Bond’s (1991) generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology 
replaces variables by their instruments, we can control for the endogeneity of the 
public/private status, at least if we do not use split samples but instead keep listed and 
unlisted companies in the same data set and use interaction terms.24 Similarly, the 
replacement by their respective instruments also controls for the endogeneity in the other 
explanatory variables. Specifically, the technique consists in taking the first differences of the 
model and then applying GMM using the lagged levels of the endogenous variables as 
instrumental variables. By taking first differences, we also control for the unobserved firm-
level fixed effect and possible measurement error. In addition, the use of fixed firm effects 
has the advantage that it controls for systematic differences in performance across firms. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2, Panel A document differences between listed and 
unlisted companies for our performance measures and control variables. Listed companies 
outperform their unlisted peers based on productivity (TFP) as well as profitability (ROA). 
Next, listed firms are significantly larger, although the difference with unlisted companies is 
of no great importance economically. The former also hold less financial leverage. Finally, 
sales growth is significantly higher in listed firms. 
 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
Panels B and C look more closely into the impact of product market competition on both 
performance measures. Panel B shows that for unlisted firms, the TFP measure is somewhat 
higher in the most concentrated industries (i.e., DHHI = 1). Concerning ROA, the situation is 
                                                
24
 If we repeat our analysis using split samples in stead of interactions, our findings remain intact. 
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different; firms in the least concentrated subgroup have a higher ROA but the difference, 
although significant, is not very large economically. For listed companies, the results are 
more straightforward. Firms under more competitive pressure (i.e. DHHI = 0) perform better 
in terms of both TFP and ROA. In Panel C, the sample is split up according to the 
competitive strategy measure (DCSM). Here, none of the differences is significant, although 
the results support the observation that in terms of productivity and profitability, unlisted 
firms are negatively affected by aggressive competition (i.e., competition in strategic 
complements), while listed firms benefit from it. 
Finally, Panel D of Table 3 reports the correlations between the performance measures, 
the measures of product market competition and the control variables. Our measures of firm 
performance are significantly positively correlated at about 53%. Also our two measures of 
competition are correlated but the coefficient is small in absolute value. The negative sign of 
the correlation suggests, in line with Sundaram et al. (1996), that aggressive competition is 
more likely when markets are less concentrated. The remainder of Panel D shows low 
correlations in absolute value among the other independent variables. 
Overall, the univariate statistics show that listed firms perform better than their unlisted 
peers. In line with our hypotheses, the data also suggest that listed companies benefit from 
competition while the picture for unlisted firms is less clear. However, as confounding factors 
may influence these results, our findings remain inconclusive. 
 
Multivariate analysis of competitive pressure 
The regression results for the performance models based on Equation (2), are reported in 
Table 3. The dependent variable in each model is either total factor productivity (TFP) or 
return on assets (ROA). Models are tested with GMM, following the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) method. The validity of using lagged values of endogenous regressors as instruments 
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was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial 
correlation in the residuals. The validity of instruments was never rejected.25 
 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
In line with earlier empirical studies on firm performance, e.g., Spanos, Zaralis and 
Lioukas (2004) and Goddard et al. (2005), we find that size has a negative impact on both 
productivity and profitability, while growth has a positive effect on these performance 
measures. We also find a negative impact of financial leverage, although most other papers 
using similar performance models find a positive relationship (e.g., Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 
1998; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999, among others). This result is largely due to the fact that 
the main part of our sample consists of unlisted firms. Goddard et al. (2005), for example 
also find a negative relationship between leverage and profitability on a sample of 
predominantly unlisted Belgian firms. Finally, consistent with the univariate results, overall, 
our listed companies also perform better, ceteris paribus, as indicated by the significantly 
positive stock listing dummy. 
More importantly however, Model 1 shows that product market concentration (HHI) has 
a positive impact on both TFP and ROA. As market concentration can be interpreted as an 
inverse measure of competitive intensity, the implication is that competition overall has a 
negative impact on performance.26 This is contrary to most empirical studies on product 
market competition, at least in the governance literature, as these typically report a positive 
relationship with competition (e.g., Nickell, 1996; Nickell et al., 1997; Januszewski et al., 
2002). However, as shown in Table 4, this is due to our sample largely consisting of unlisted 
                                                
25
 The M1 and M2 tests, reported in the respective tables, suggest that the error term has a moving average 
structure of order one, as one would expect in the differenced form of the equation, when the idiosyncratic 
component of the error term in the level equation is serially uncorrelated. Both tests suggest that variables 
lagged twice or more are legitimate instruments. 
26
 When we replace the continuous variable (HHI) with the dummy variable (DHHI), results remain similar. 
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firms. Model 2 also includes our measure for competitive strategy (DCSM). As DCSM = 1 
indicates competition in strategic complements, the negative sign of its coefficient shows that 
firms operating in industries characterized by more aggressive interaction have lower 
productivity (TFP). Again, as we show below, this is driven by the unlisted companies in our 
sample. Interestingly, also the impact of market concentration remains. This indicates that 
both measures of competition have a significant impact on performance.27 
 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
***************************** 
 
To investigate the difference between listed and unlisted companies, we introduce 
interactions of the listed dummy with the two measures of product market competition. These 
results are presented in Table 4. In line with our Hypothesis 1, Model 1 shows a positive 
effect of market concentration on performance for unlisted firms but a negative effect for 
listed companies. That is, competitive intensity hurts unlisted companies but improves 
performance in listed ones. Consistent with our hypothesis 2, the competitive strategy 
measure shows a similar result; competition in strategic complements reduces performance in 
unlisted companies while the reverse happens for their listed peers. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the notion that competitive pressure enhances performance only if firms have 
sufficient financing resources.28 The impact of competition proves to be economically 
meaningful as well. The inter quartile range for market concentration (HHI) represents a 
3.9% drop in TFP and a 1% drop in ROA for unlisted companies against an increase in TFP 
                                                
27
 Sundaram et al. (1996) argue that the mode of strategic interaction is influenced by the degree of market 
concentration and therefore estimate an equation explaining their CSM measure as a function of market 
concentration. In line with this idea we estimate an equation explaining our continuous industry-wide CSM 
measure by market concentration (HHI). The error term in this auxiliary regression is then used to calculate an 
instrumented DCSM measure. When we use the latter instead of the original DCSM dummy our findings 
remain. 
28
 In our preliminary analysis we did not include industry effects as they can be considered to be subsumed by 
the individual firm effects. We checked for the robustness of our results by including industry dummies to 
capture consistent heterogeneity in performance across different industries. Results were very similar to the ones 
reported and are available upon request. 
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and ROA of 10% and 1.7% respectively for the listed companies. Similarly, operating in an 
environment of aggressive competition causes, ceteris paribus, a drop in TFP of 4.8% and a 
decrease in ROA of 0.8% for unlisted companies. For listed firms, on the other hand, 
aggressive competition boosts productivity by 16% and profitability by 1.7%, all else being 
equal. 
In Model 2 of Table 4, we use interaction terms for the two measures of competition. To 
make results more easily interpretable, we apply the dummy variable DHHI instead of the 
continuous market concentration variable HHI.29 The coefficients for the control variables 
remain largely unaltered between Model 1 and Model 2. In addition, Model 2 indicates that 
competition in strategic complements (DCSM=1) only has an effect on unlisted firms when 
they operate in industries with low concentration; i.e., when (1–DHHI) = 1. In that case, 
aggressive competitive interaction harms them, making them about 10% less productive 
compared to other firms in their industry and reducing ROA by 1.1%. By contrast, under the 
same circumstances listed firms benefit. Robustness tests in the section below further support 
these interpretations.30 
Before moving on to the section on robustness issues, it is also of interest to note that 
when we split up the leverage variable by interacting it with the listed dummy, leverage only 
has a significantly negative impact for unlisted companies; for listed firms the sign reverses. 
The coefficient is highly significant in case of ROA and marginally significant for the TFP 
model. This finding is in line with the often used argument that, at least in listed firms, the 
pressure of debt servicing solves problems of free cash flow, and hence, improves 
performance (Jensen, 1986; Nickell et al., 1997; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). By contrast, 
for unlisted firms the results suggest that the pressure of debt servicing creates harmful 
                                                
29
 Similar results obtain if HHI is used instead of DHHI. 
30
 Variables L and HHI were deleted when used in the interaction terms of the models of Table 4 to avoid any 
possible problems of inference. Moreover their interpretation would become difficult. 
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financing constraints and reduces performance (e.g., Rajan, 1992 and McConnell and 
Servaes, 1995). 
 
ROBUSTNESS ISSUES 
 
The Lerner index 
As a first robustness check, we replace market concentration with a Lerner index as an 
alternative measure for product market competition. Following Aghion et al.’s (2005) 
methodology, we calculate individual price-cost-margins for companies by dividing the 
operating profits in a certain year by the sales of that year. Similarly to our HHI measure, we 
define industries on the basis of triple digit NACE codes and use all European companies 
from the Amadeus data base that file consolidated accounts. Company-specific price-cost-
margins are averaged over all companies in a particular industry, resulting in an industry-
specific Lerner index (price-cost-margin) for each year (LERN).31 Next to the continuous 
measure of the Lerner index, we construct a dummy (DLERN) that indicates whether the 
Lerner index of a certain industry is above the total sample’s average in a particular year. 
Aghion et al. (2005) claim that the most important advantage of the Lerner index over market 
concentration is that it relies less heavily on the precise definition of geographic location and 
product market environment. Table 5 reports the results for the same performance models as 
in Table 4 safe for the replacement of HHI with LERN. 
 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
***************************** 
 
Overall, our results are very robust to this change in measure of product market 
competition. Price-cost-margins in an industry positively influence productivity of unlisted 
                                                
31
 Note that the continuous Lerner index is significantly positively correlated (about 0.20) with our measure of 
market concentration (HHI). 
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firms while it has the opposite impact on the listed ones. Since these price-cost-margins 
(Lerner index) can be interpreted as an inverse measure of product market competition, our 
conclusions remain that competitive pressure is only beneficial for listed companies. Also the 
interactions of competitive intensity with competitive interactions remain similar to the 
models with HHI (Table 4). The interaction of the Lerner index dummy (DLERN) with 
DCSM reveals that aggressive competition (DCSM = 1) is most devastating for unlisted firms 
in industries with low price-cost-margins. For listed firms on the other hand, aggressive 
competition is more beneficial in industries with low price-cost-margins.  
 
Cash flow sensitivity of investment 
In a second robustness test, we check the conclusions drawn from the performance models 
using investment equations. If our arguments and interpretations are correct, we should 
observe that as competitive pressure mounts, investment decisions by unlisted firms are 
increasingly hampered by financing constraints, while free cash flow problems in listed firms 
are reduced. The estimation of investment-cash flow sensitivity models offers opportunities 
to evaluate the preceding questions (see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997 and Cleary, 1999, for an extensive discussion on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity). In particular, if investment decisions are purely driven by the net present value 
rule, internal cash generation should have no impact on investment. However, in practice, 
either financing constraints or free cash flow problems can cause a positive sensitivity. To 
distinguish between these two causes, we follow the relevant literature (e.g., Schiantarelli and 
Sembenelli, 2001; Degryse and de Jong, 2006; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005) and evaluate 
the pattern of cash flow sensitivity as a function of the variables of interest in our study, i.e., 
the listing dummy and the measures of competition. Specifically, if financing constraints are 
an important driver of our findings concerning the performance for unlisted firms, the latter 
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should show a significant cash flow sensitivity that, moreover, increases with competitive 
pressure. The reason is that if competition enhances financing constraints, cash flow 
sensitivity should rise as a function of competition. By contrast, the findings reported in the 
previous section imply that for listed firms the reverse should happen. Specifically, if in listed 
firms competition improves performance as it limits free cash flow problems, cash flow 
sensitivity should decrease with competitive pressure. 
We use the following standard investment equation, in analogy with Audretsch and 
Weigand (2005) and Degryse and de Jong (2006), among others, and augment it with the 
variables of interest for our study: 
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β+∆β+∆β+β+∆β+µ+α=   
+ δ1*COMPETITIONit + δ2*Interactions     (3) 
 
In Equation (3), Iit stands for gross investment defined as the change in the real capital 
stock (K) plus depreciation. Capital stock (K) is proxied by tangible fixed assets. The 
parameter αi represents an unobservable firm-level fixed effect while µt is used to control for 
fixed time effects. ∆S represents the growth of real sales. As a measure for internally 
generated funds, we use real cash flow (CF). In line with Bhagat, Moyen and Suh (2005), we 
take into account that some of the internally generated funds are committed to debtors (via 
interests) or to the government (through taxes). Therefore, we start out from EBITDA and 
subtract interests and taxes to arrive at our cash flow measure. All variables are normalized 
by the capital stock at the beginning of the period. In order to correct for relative price 
differences over the years, we deflate all nominal values with the consumer price index. Due 
to the unavailability of a market price for unlisted firms, we use sales growth instead of 
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Tobin’s Q as a measure for investment opportunities. This approach has also been adopted by 
other authors like Konings, Rizov and Vandenbussche (2003) and Audretsch and Weigand 
(2005). However, just as Tobin’s Q, this measure may not sufficiently capture investment 
opportunities. As a result, some of this information can also be reflected in cash flow. In 
order to identify the liquidity role of cash flow, we augment our investment model with the 
change in net working capital relative to the real capital stock (∆WC/K), an approach also 
used by Audretsch and Weigand (2005) and Degryse and De Jong (2006). We further 
augment our model with standard control variables as typically defined in this literature, i.e., 
the change in interest bearing debt standardized by the capital stock (∆FINDEBT/K) and 
SIZE as measured by the logarithm of total assets. Finally, we add the variables of special 
interest to our study: the measures of competition, the listing dummy and/or interaction 
terms. 
 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
Model 1 of Table 6 shows that growth opportunities (∆S/K) have a positive impact on 
investment. This suggests that our investment model is not a bad approximation for 
describing the investment behavior of large Belgian companies. The sign of the change in 
working capital is negative, indicating that cash flow indeed measures liquidity rather than 
investment opportunities. In line with other empirical studies, we find that the changes in 
financial debt and size are positively related to investment (e.g., Degryse and de Jong, 2006 
and Audretsch and Weigand, 2005). More interestingly, however, splitting up the cash flow 
variable according to listing status reveals that there is significant investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, but only among unlisted firms. This absence of sensitivity in listed companies 
suggests that, on average, free cash flow problems are limited. In fact, the predominant 
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presence of large shareholders in our sample companies likely accounts for this result.32 
Nevertheless, Models 2 and 3 indicate that one should interpret this finding with care. Model 
2 further interacts cash flow sensitivity with the market concentration dummy DHHI while 
Model 3 uses the strategic interaction dummy DCSM instead.33 In Model 2 the term (1 – 
L)*CF/K measures cash flow sensitivity for unlisted firms in case of low concentration while 
the term (1 – L)*CF/K*DHHI reflects the extra effect when market concentration is high, i.e., 
when DHHI = 1. The terms involving L can be interpreted similarly for listed companies. The 
results show that when one moves from low to high concentration, cash flow sensitivity drops 
significantly for unlisted firms. Or equivalently, when competition is intense, cash flow 
sensitivity is higher than in the case of weak competition. This pattern of increasing cash flow 
sensitivity with competitive pressure indicates financing constraints. For the listed firms the 
reverse happens. When one moves from low to high concentration, there is a significant 
increase in sensitivity. This finding therefore suggests that listed firms likely experience free 
cash flow problems when competitive intensity is low since cash flow sensitivity is 
significantly higher in these circumstances. Exactly similar findings are obtained in Model 3, 
where instead of market concentration, the strategic interaction dummy (DCSM) is used. In 
case of aggressive interaction or competition in strategic complements (DCSM = 1), unlisted 
firms become more financially constrained while in listed companies free cash flow problems 
are resolved. These results are completely in line with those concerning performance. Under 
intense competition or aggressive competitive interaction, the performance of unlisted 
companies declines while that of listed firms improves. In addition, compared with Model 1, 
                                                
32
 As in the models of Table 3, we have deleted the separate variable whenever it was used to split up cash flow.  
However, when the models are augmented with the listing dummy, the coefficient of the latter becomes positive 
and significant; otherwise results remain totally intact. The inclusion of market concentration has no effect on 
our basic findings either while its coefficient remains insignificant. 
33
 The dummy DHHI is used instead of HHI for the sake of interpreting the interaction terms with CF. 
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this further split up of cash flow sensitivity into Models 2 and 3 has no impact on the control 
variables of the investment equation. 
Finally, Table 7 includes interaction terms between the two measures of competition. 
Here, (1 – L)*CF/K reflects cash flow sensitivity of the unlisted companies in case of 
competition in strategic substitutes (i.e., DCSM = 0). The term (1 – L)*CF/K*(1 – 
DHHI)*DCSM captures the extra effect of low concentration when competitive interaction is 
aggressive (i.e., when DCSM = 1). Similarly, the term (1 – L)*CF/K*DHHI*DCSM reflects 
the extra impact of high concentration under competition in complements. The results show 
that increasing competitive pressure, from accommodating to aggressive competitive 
interaction, enhances cash flow sensitivity, and even more so when aggressive interaction is 
combined with low concentration. Hence, the pattern in investment-cash flow sensitivity 
suggests that unlisted firms increasingly suffer from financing constraints when strategic 
interaction is aggressive, and even more so when this is combined with intense competition. 
Just as in Table 6, the pattern reverses for listed firms. Interestingly, aggressive competition 
only has a significant disciplining effect when market concentration is low (i.e., when 1 – 
DHHI = 1). Again, these findings are consistent with our earlier results for performance in 
Model 2 of Table 4. 
 
***************************** 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
****************************** 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper studies the impact of competition on performance. Unlike the governance 
literature, which typically considers only listed companies, we extend our sample to large 
unlisted companies in order to include a broader range of access to external financing. This 
approach allows us to compare the impact of competition in companies with relatively less 
financing constraints but likely more free cash flow problems, with its impact in companies 
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with likely significant financing constraints and less free cash flow problems. In line with the 
literature, we find that competition has a positive impact on performance for listed 
companies. Furthermore, estimates of investment-cash flow sensitivity indicate that without 
sufficient competitive pressure, free cash flow problems emerge. For unlisted companies we 
find exactly the reverse pattern. Performance declines under strong competitive pressure, 
while the cash flow sensitivity analysis reveals that under these circumstances companies 
suffer from increasing financing constraints.  
Next to the classical inverse measures of competition, i.e., market concentration and the 
industry-specific Lerner index, we also use an empirical version of the competitive strategy 
measure that describes the type of strategic interactions predominant in a certain industry 
(i.e., competition in strategic complements or competition in strategic substitutes). We find 
that both aspects of competition not only influence firm performance directly, but they also 
tend to interact. Our evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that while competition in 
strategic complements is more likely to exacerbate financing constraints for firms with 
limited access to external financing, it plays a disciplining role to reduce free cash flow 
problems in unconstrained firms. 
Our results also suggest several avenues for further research, as well as some policy 
implications. As a stock listing alleviates detrimental financial pressure, but in doing so can 
create free cash flow problems, an interesting avenue of research is the question of whether or 
not, and under what competitive conditions, other solutions to relax financing constraints—
like business groups or private equity—could be more effective. Another interesting avenue 
concerns a more detailed investigation into the product market conditions under which firms 
opt for an IPO, and subsequently benefit from it. In terms of policy implications, our results 
show that, as listed firms are better able to withstand aggressive competition, in a world with 
globalizing and increasing competition, governments in countries with relatively few listed 
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firms should be aware of the fact that limited use of the stock market contributes to the loss of 
competitive edge of their economies. Furthermore, our paper indicates that in designing 
policies to enhance competition, governments should be aware that it impacts quite 
differently on listed and unlisted firms of the industry, and in doing so provides some 
companies with a competitive advantage over others. Furthermore, our paper shows that also 
well established very large unlisted companies can suffer from financing constraints. This 
suggests that monetary tightening not only significantly affects smaller firms, but the 
investment behavior of the whole unlisted business sector. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable definitions 
Performance variables 
TFP Firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) is measured as the residual of the industry-
specific log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function. 
ROA (Earnings before interest and taxes)/(Total assets) 
  
Control variables 
SIZE Ln(Total assets) 
FINLEV (Interest bearing debt)/(Total assets) 
GROWTH Salesgrowth
 
  
Product market competition variables 
HHI 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index for a certain year measured as the sum of squared market 
shares over all companies in an industry (based on 3 digit Nace Codes of all 
consolidating European companies from in the Amadeus database), using turnover. 
Lerner 
Industry-specific (based on 3 digit Nace Codes of all consolidating European companies 
from the Amadeus database) Lerner index averaging the firm’s price-cost-margins (net 
profit divided by turnover) for a particular year. 
CSM 
Coefficient of correlation in a certain year between each firm’s marginal profit (the 
change in profits divided by the change in turnover) and the change in competitor output 
(based on 3 digit Nace Codes of all consolidating European companies from the 
Amadeus database) using turnover.  
  
Stock market listing variable 
L Dummy variable with value 1 if a firm was listed in a certain year and 0 otherwise. 
  
Investment model variables 
I/K (Annual change in fixed tangible assets + depreciation)/(Fixed tangible assets) 
∆S/K (Annual change in sales)/(Fixed tangible assets) 
CF/K (Earnings before interests, taxes and depreciation – interests paid – taxes)/(Fixed tangible 
assets)
 
∆WC/K (Annual change in net working capital)/(Fixed tangible assets) 
∆FINDEBT/K (Annual change in interest bearing debt)/(Fixed tangible assets) 
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Table 1: Sample Composition 
Panel A: Panel data structure 
Year All Firms Unlisted Listed 
1993 161 123 38 
1994 155 118 37 
1995 128 98 30 
1996 110 80 30 
1997 156 112 44 
1998 172 120 52 
1999 207 144 63 
2000 220 150 70 
2001 253 183 70 
2002 276 203 73 
2003 230 164 66 
2004 238 170 68 
2005 212 147 65 
All 2518 1812 706 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Industry Number of firms Unlisted Listed 
Food & Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Distribution 
Transportation 
Services 
 
Total firms 
44 
137 
20 
82 
29 
124 
 
435 
34 
96 
17 
64 
27 
98 
 
335 
10  
41 
3 
18 
2 
26 
 
100 
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Tabel 2: Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
  Full 
Sample Unlisted Listed Test p-values 
Mean 0.0074 –0.0087 0.0808 31.99*** 0.00 
TFP 
Median 0.0068 –0.0054 0.0636 5.23*** 0.00 
Mean 0.0564 0.0554 0.0610 4.18** 0.04 
ROA 
Median 0.0505 0.0494 0.0545 2.91*** 0.00 
Mean 11.59 11.47 12.15 169.21*** 0.00 
SIZE 
Median 11.38 11.28 12.11 11.74*** 0.00 
Mean 0.2471 0.2505 0.2317 5.62** 0.02 
FINLEV 
Median 0.2345 0.2408 0.2169 2.41** 0.02 
Mean 0.0561 0.0479 0.0907 16.92*** 0.00 GROWTH 
Median 0.0440 0.0404 0.0582 3.56*** 0.00 
 
Panel B: Performance measures and market concentration 
Unlisted Firms 
  DHHI = 0 DHHI = 1 Test p-values 
Mean –0.0187 0.0039 2.86* 0.09 
TFP 
Median –0.0063 –0.0031 0.75 0.45 
Mean 0.0590 0.0507 12.83*** 0.00 
ROA 
Median 0.0502 0.0473 2.76*** 0.01 
Listed Firms 
  DHHI = 0 DHHI = 1 Test p-values 
Mean 0.0907 0.0767 0.18 0.66 
TFP 
Median 0.0912 0.0466 1.62* 0.10 
Mean 0.0677 0.0583 2.53 0.11 
ROA 
Median 0.0599 0.0540 1.64* 0.10 
 
Panel C: Performance measures and competitive strategy measure 
Unlisted Firms 
  DCSM = 0 DCSM = 1 Test p-values 
Mean –0.0006 –0.0170 1.49 0.22 
TFP 
Median –0.0037 –0.0064 0.41 0.67 
Mean 0.0567 0.0540 1.41 0.23 
ROA 
Median 0.0508 0.0487 1.17 0.24 
Listed Firms 
  DCSM = 0 DCSM = 1 Test p-values 
Mean 0.0724 0.0907 0.38 0.53 
TFP 
Median 0.0594 0.0656 0.31 0.75 
Mean 0.0590 0.0635 0.70 0.40 
ROA 
Median 0.0539 0.0573 0.80 0.42 
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Panel D: Pearsons’ Correlation Matrix 
 TFP ROA FINLEV Size GROWTH HHI DCSM 
TFP 1 0.526*** –0.103*** 0.051** 0.167*** 0.010 –0.004 
  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.64) (0.85) 
ROA 
 1 –0.214*** 0.030 0.194*** –0.012 –0.005 
  
  (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.54) (0.79) 
FINLEV 
  1 0.044** –0.005 0.030 0.010 
  
   (0.02) (0.80) (0.14) (0.61) 
SIZE 
   1 0.065*** 0.103*** –0.011 
  
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) 
GROWTH 
    1 0.009 –0.006 
  
     (0.65) (0.75) 
HHI 
     1 –0.053** 
  
      (0.01) 
DCSM 
      1 
Notes: For Panels A, B and C the F-test statistic for the means test and the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Z-statistic 
for the median test are given in the respective rows together with the corresponding p-value. Total factor 
productivity measure (TFP) is estimated as the error terms of industry specific Cobb-Douglas production 
functions and the return on assets (ROA) is measured as net income over total assets. The measures of product 
market competition and the control variables are as defined in the Appendix. Panel D reports the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the performance measures and explanatory variables. Level of significance: 
***1%; **5%; *10%. 
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Table 3: Performance models 
Model 1 Model 2 Explanatory 
variables TFP ROA TFP ROA 
Performance(-1) 0.1144*** 
(4.97) 
0.3765*** 
(11.71) 
0.0621*** 
(2.90) 
0.3631*** 
(11.22) 
SIZE –0.1988*** 
(-6.97) 
–0.0497*** 
(-5.07) 
–0.2236*** 
(-8.46) 
–0.0499*** 
(-5.94) 
FINLEV –0.2402*** 
(-2.74) 
–0.0564* 
(-1.82) 
–0.2242*** 
(-2.74) 
–0.0682** 
(-2.29) 
GROWTH 0.2344*** 
(7.51) 
0.0252*** 
(5.70) 
0.1795*** 
(6.82) 
0.0246*** 
(5.46) 
HHI 0.1198*** 
(2.73) 
0.0301* 
(1.61) 
0.1454*** 
(3.34) 
0.0305* 
(1.69) 
DCSM 
- - 
–0.0348* 
(-1.81) 
–0.0040* 
(-1.65) 
L 0.5666* 
(1.66) 
0.0834** 
(1.99) 
0.6032* 
(1.68) 
0.0782** 
(2.12) 
Sargan Test 0.627 0.653 0.666 0.662 
m1 *** *** *** *** 
m2 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Notes: The dependent variable is either the total factor productivity measure (TFP) estimated 
as the error terms of industry specific Cobb-Douglas production functions or the return on 
assets (ROA). The measures of product market competition and the control variables are as 
defined in the Appendix. Models are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in 
parentheses). The validity of using lagged values from t-2 and before of endogenous regressors as 
instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial 
correlation in the residuals m1 and m2. The Sargan test is χ 2 distributed; its p-values are reported in 
the Table. Levels of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%; n.s. indicates non significance. 
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Table 4: Interaction of competition measures in performance models 
Model 1  Model 2 Explanatory 
variables TFP ROA  TFP ROA 
Performance(-1) 0.1198*** 
(5.92) 
0.3943*** 
(12.33) 
Performance(-1) 0.1017*** 
(5.18) 
0.3388*** 
(9.69) 
SIZE –0.1485*** 
(-5.55) 
–0.0438*** 
(-5.03) 
SIZE –0.1252*** 
(-4.86) 
–0.0356*** 
(-4.32) 
FINLEV –0.2227*** 
(-2.67) 
–0.0921*** 
(-2.75) 
FINLEV –0.2165*** 
(-2.88) 
–0.0671** 
(-2.18) 
GROWTH 0.2394*** 
(8.05) 
0.0258*** 
(5.64) 
GROWTH 0.2183*** 
(7.56) 
0.0235*** 
(5.44) 
(1-L)*HHI 0.3000*** 
(3.08) 
0.0761*** 
(3.94) 
(1-L)*(1-DHHI) 
*DCSM 
–0.1085*** 
(-3.68) 
–0.0114** 
(-2.40) 
L*HHI 
–0.7865** 
(-2.04) 
–0.1337** 
(-2.11) 
(1-L)*DHHI* 
DCSM 
0.0274 
(1.28) 
0.0016 
(0.26) 
(1-L)*DCSM 
–0.0482*** 
(-2.82) 
–0.0081*** 
(-2.60) 
L*(1-DHHI)* 
DCSM 
0.1474** 
(2.05) 
0.0465** 
(2.27) 
L*DCSM 0.1640*** 
(2.66) 
0.0171* 
(1.68) 
L*DHHI* 
DCSM 
–0.0093 
(–0.10) 
–0.0037 
(–0.35) 
Sargan Test 0.389 0.578  0.496 0.823 
m1 *** ***  *** *** 
m2 n.s. n.s.  n.s. n.s. 
Notes: The dependent variable is either the total factor productivity measure (TFP) estimated as the 
error terms of industry specific Cobb-Douglas production functions or the return on assets (ROA). 
The measures of product market competition and the control variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. Models are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses). The validity of using lagged 
values from t-2 and before of endogenous regressors as instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals m1 and m2. The Sargan test is χ 2 
distributed; its p-values are reported in the Table. Levels of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%; n.s. indicates 
non significance. 
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Table 5: Alternative measures of competition in performance models 
Model 1  Model 2 Explanatory 
variables TFP ROA  TFP ROA 
Performance(-1) 0.1062*** 
(5.31) 
0.3221*** 
(7.84) 
Performance(-1) 0.1293*** 
(6.41) 
0.2557*** 
(6.57) 
SIZE –0.1427*** 
(-5.26) 
–0.0345*** 
(-4.19) 
SIZE –0.1635*** 
(-5.81) 
–0.0409*** 
(-5.92) 
FINLEV –0.2650*** 
(-3.07) 
–0.1558*** 
(-4.38) 
FINLEV –0.2148*** 
(-2.58) 
–0.1442*** 
(-3.84) 
GROWTH 0.2364*** 
(7.42) 
0.0222*** 
(5.16) 
GROWTH 0.2251*** 
(7.04) 
0.0192*** 
(4.68) 
(1-L)*LERN 1.4127*** 
(2.73) 
0.0141*** 
(2.68) 
(1-L)*(1-DLERN) 
*DCSM 
–0.0835** 
(-2.50) 
–0.0108** 
(-2.33) 
L*LERN -3.9416*** 
(-2.97) 
–0.0655*** 
(-2.77) 
(1-L)*DLERN* 
DCSM 
0.0078 
(0.25) 
0.0091 
(1.65) 
(1-L)*DCSM –0.0596*** 
(-3.15) 
–0.0075** 
(-2.41) 
L*(1-DLERN)* 
DCSM 
0.2464*** 
(2.79) 
0.0204** 
(1.93) 
L*DCSM 0.2133*** 
(3.09) 
0.0198* 
(1.93) 
L*DLERN* 
DCSM 
0.0559 
(0.62) 
–0.0194 
(-1.11) 
Sargan Test 0.733 0.672  0.878 0.446 
m1 *** ***  *** *** 
m2 n.s. n.s.  n.s. n.s. 
Notes: The dependent variable is either the total factor productivity measure (TFP) estimated as the 
error terms of industry specific Cobb-Douglas production functions or the return on assets (ROA). 
The measures of product market competition and the control variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. Models are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses). The validity of using lagged 
values from t-2 and before of endogenous regressors as instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals m1 and m2. The Sargan test is χ 2 
distributed; its p-values are reported in the Table. Levels of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%; n.s. indicates 
non significance. 
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Table 6: Basic investment models 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
∆S/K 0.1376*** 
(147.49) 
0.1363*** 
(94.33) 
0.1409*** 
(132.74) 
(1-L)*CF/K 0.5494*** 
(9.06) 
0.6344*** 
(6.76) 
0.3336*** 
(4.83) 
(1-L)*CF/K*DHHI 
- 
–0.4993*** 
(-5.73) - 
(1-L)*CF/K*DCSM 
- - 
0.5224*** 
(10.11) 
L*CF/K 0.1009 
(1.10) 
0.0745 
(1.18) 
0.2659*** 
(2.78) 
L*CF/K*DHHI 
- 
0.1885* 
(1.87) - 
L*CF/K*DCSM 
- - 
–0.2903** 
(-2.49) 
∆WC/K –0.5515*** 
(-3.00) 
–0.6212*** 
(-3.27) 
–0.3865** 
(-2.22) 
∆FINDEBT/K 0.1124*** 
(7.76) 
0.0871*** 
(5.11) 
0.1131*** 
(6.24) 
SIZE 0.2162*** 
(6.64) 
0.3182*** 
(9.88) 
0.2817*** 
(7.41) 
HHI –0.0107 
(–0.15) - - 
Sargan Test 0.209 0.513 0.143 
m1 *** *** *** 
m2 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the investment ratio (I/K), explanatory variables are 
defined in the appendix. Models are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in parentheses). The validity 
of using lagged values from t-2 and before of endogenous regressors as instruments was evaluated with 
the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals m1 and 
m2. The Sargan test is χ 2 distributed; its p-values are reported in the Table. Levels of significance: 
***1%; **5%; *10%; n.s. indicates non significance. 
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Table 7: Interactions of competition measures in investment models 
Explanatory variables  
∆S/K 0.1413*** (140.00) 
(1-L)*CF/K 0.3110*** (4.74) 
(1-L)*CF/K* 
(1-DHHI)*DCSM 
0.7875*** 
(6.07) 
(1-L)*CF/K* 
DHHI*DCSM 
0.3187*** 
(3.55) 
L*CF/K 0.2152** (2.16) 
L*CF/K* 
(1-DHHI)*DCSM 
–0.3381* 
(-1.72) 
L*CF/K* 
DHHI*DCSM 
–0.1768 
(–0.92) 
∆WC/K –0.3251* (-1.74) 
∆FINDEBT/K 0.1333*** (4.61) 
SIZE 0.2790*** (3.38) 
Sargan Test 0.411 
m1 *** 
m2 n.s. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the investment ratio (I/K), explanatory variables 
are defined in the appendix. Models are tested with GMM, estimated in first differences using 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) method (White's heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics in 
parentheses). The validity of using lagged values from t-2 and before of endogenous regressors 
as instruments was evaluated with the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and direct tests 
of serial correlation in the residuals m1 and m2. The Sargan test is χ 2 distributed; its p-values 
are reported in the Table. Levels of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%; n.s. indicates non 
significance. 
 
